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RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE
SUPREME COURT
By G. A. H. FRASER, of the Denver Bar
HE word "recent" in the title is intended to carry back
to January, 1934, the date of the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium case, the first of several decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States which made conservatives
stare and gasp. From that time to March, 1936, 67 statutes,
state and federal, have been tested, in whole or in part, by that
court, of which 26 were held unconstitutional and 41 constitutional. Forty-six of the 67 were state statutes, and of these
16 were held unconstitutional and 30 constitutional. Twentyone of the 67 were federal statutes, and of these 10 were held
unconstitutional and 11 constitutional.
Charles Warren, in the last edition of his book, "Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court," states that up
to June, 1935, the court had held only 73 federal statutes
unconstitutional in about 146 years of its existence, an average of one every two years. Obviously the proportion of
rejections has vastly increased of late, and the overthrow of
state statutes is also extensive. When one scans the last seven
volumes of Supreme Court reports, two reasons for this leap
to the eye. One is the multiplication of ill-devised tax laws,
whereby honestly puzzled or thievishly spendthrift legislatures have cast about for untapped sources of revenue, but
more important is the mass of novel and experimental enactments, state and federal, designed for the relief of debtors, the
regulation of business in matters heretofore left to individual
initiative, the equalizing of wealth, or the creation of prosperity by statute. These well-meant measures have often
been framed without regard to the basic liberties of the citizen under the constitution, or the equally basic duality of our
system with specifically limited powers in the federal government and all the residue in the states. Such legislative encroachments were foreseen by Thomas Jefferson when he
wrote:
"The executive, in our government, is not the sole, it is scarcely
the principal object of my jealousy. The tyranny of the legislatures is
the most formidable dread at present, and will be for many years. That
of the executive will come in its turn, but it will be at a remote period."
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Through this welter the court has moved with its usual
impartiality, but with less than its usual accord. During the
last two years it has been unanimous in the great majority of
cases involving general law, but not in the tax cases or the
constitutional cases, and this is due both to the close and difficult questions presented and to the inborn qualities of the
judges themselves. In Gilbert and Sullivan's "Iolanthe," the
sentry, as he stalks up and down before the palace, sings:
"How every little boy or gal
That's ever born into the world alive
Is either a little liberal
Or else a little conservative."

This is a universal cleavage of human kind, often widened by heredity, environment, education and experience of
life. Hence it is natural to find the present Supreme bench
composed of four reliable conservatives, three equally dependable liberals (both terms only loosely descriptive), and two
unpredictables, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Roberts, who
are found as often in one camp as in the other. There has
seldom been a better balanced court. In the great cases of the
recent past the liberals tend to favor social measures against
the assertion of individual rights. Also, to them the voice of
the legislature is the voice of the people, and therefore the
voice of God. They recognize, of course, the dominance of
constitutional restrictions, but would rather loosen than contract them, and especially in considering state statutes they
tend to give such wide and prevailing effect to the state police
power that anyone who attacks a statute under the "due process of law" or "equal protection of the laws" clause of the
14th Amendment is likely to have a bout of bad luck. In
all this they are frequently supported by the two free-lances.
The conservatives tend toward a more literal construction and
stricter application of the constitution. It is there that they
hear the voice of the people, authoritative through generations
of experience. They constantly invoke it to defend individual
liberty against the exactions and restrictions of the legislature and this is very noticeable in tax cases, where their regular tendency is to protect the taxpayer wherever possible. It
thus appears that both lines of constitutional interpretation
are ably represented: now one, now the other prevails accord-
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ing to the merits of the case, and justice is attained as substantially and as uniformly as can ever be hoped for in a fallible
world.
The Literary Digest reports that Judge Manton of the
2nd C. C. A. recently attacked the conservative wing of the
court for, as he said, thrusting its "pet economic or social theory" into the constitution. If this criticism is correct, which I
do not believe, exactly the same is true of the liberals, and of
late there have been many critics of both wings of the court,
such as the man, Raymond Clapper, who daily strews our
breakfast tables with the sweepings of the Washington pressrooms.
None of us likes to have his preferences thwarted, and
probably each of us, from the radical to the reactionary, would
have preferred some of the late decisions to have gone the
other way; but when you read, not merely one or two, but
the entire recent series of great constitutional opinions, including the dissents, where there were dissents, you cannot fail to be impressed by the straight course the court has
steered through troubled waters, and by the honesty and
earnestness with which all the judges without exception
have applied their very high abilities to doing absolute right
as they severally saw it.
Representative Zioncheck recently said in Congress: "I
do not believe that the judges of the Supreme Court are gods;
in my opinion only three of them are gods," and yet these
three, with their well-known liberal views, joined in rejecting the Frazier-Lemke Mortgage Act, the NRA itself, and a
number of minor enactments, and two of them joined in the
rejection of the so-cMled "hot oil" Act. The man who says,
as many are saying, that the Supreme Court is in politics, or
that it has decided cases to suit the social or economic prejudices of its members, is either an ignoramus or a blinded partisan or a hired propagandist and I believe that every honest
lawyer, from the conservative to the communist, should repel
such slanders whenever heard. The essential nature of the
men leads one set to feel that a strict constitutional construction is right and the other set a free construction, but you have
only to read their opinions to see that beyond this inherent
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quality their minds are bent solely on the legal qualities of the
statute before them, as tested by the constitution.
What, then, has the court actually decided in the last two
years?
With 6 7 cases before us we can choose very few and touch
those very lightly. Decisions on state statutes are quite as
instructive as those on federal statutes, although less sensational, and there is one group which I am impelled to mention.
As you all know, there is no constitutional ground on which
state statutes are more frequently attacked than the 14th
Amendment, forbidding the state to deny due process of law
or the equal protection of the laws, expressions which are very
wide and indefinite and leave much room for diversity of opinion among judges. It is worth while to notice the Supreme
Court test as illustrated by the New York milk cases, which
are as interesting economically as legally. They show what
happens when a state attempts to fit ordinary business to a
legislative bed of Procrustes. There are seven or eight of these
milk cases, so that my attempt will be merely to do a little
skimming.
New York state suffered from an overproduction of
milk. Farmers complained that they did not make expenses.
Dealers complained that there was price-cutting and competition destructive of their profits. Consumers were not complaining, but who pays any attention to consumers? The
legislature undertook to remedy the situation by fixing a minimum price of 5 cents a quart to be paid by dealers to farmers and a minimum of 10 cents a quart to be charged to consumers by dealers who made delivery, or 9 cents a quart
by dealers selling over the counter. A small Italian grocer
sold two quarts for 18 cents and gave a 5-cent loaf of bread
as a bonus (suggesting, incidentally, the size of the profit
which dealers were making under the artificial price). He
had to go to jail for that, and in Nebbia vs. New York, 291
U. S. 502, the Supreme Court by a 5-4 decision left him there.
The question was whether the state had the right to fix prices
of an ordinary commodity, or whether its price-fixing power
was limited to public utilities or to a business directly affected
with a public interest. Mr. Justice Roberts says for the majority that, as the state may protect free competition and pro-
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hibit monopolies, so equally it may restrict competition if it
thinks it wise; that it is for the legislature to decide what trade
or business needs control for the public good, and that when it
controls it, by price-fixing or otherwise, the law "is unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt, and
hence an unnecessary and unwarrantable interference with
public liberty." The four conservatives observed that the decision went beyond anything previously held by the court and
paved the way for legislative despotism.
The next step was taken by consumers. Deprived by
law of cheap milk, they naturally tried to get the best milk for
their money, and turned to Borden's and similar reliable and
well-known brands. Thereupon, the wise milk board, deeming that Borden et al. were getting too much business, to the
detriment of less-known dealers, passed another regulation
providing that dealers "having a well-advertised trade name"
must charge 1 cent more per quart to consumers than more
obscure vendors. This also was upheld by a 5-4 decision
(Borden's Farm vs. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 453), on the
ground that the state power to regulate business includes the
power to equalize it. The four conservatives, or, to my thinking, liberal dissenters, considered the law grossly arbitrary
and oppressive, as penalizing the man who becomes wellknown and successful through wide and honest dealing and
depriving him of the equal protection of the laws.
The next point in this object lesson in the economics of
artificial high prices was raised by a new set of dealers-I do
not say a set of New Dealers. Observing the opportunity of
profit in the 100 per cent spread between the price at which
dealers must buy and must sell, they rushed into the New
York market, to the disturbance of the unstable equilibrium
artificially created. Thereupon the milk board, in a desperate
attempt to maintain its theory of equalized trade, issued a new
ukase to the effect that any dealer entering the business after a
certain date must sell for not less than Mr. Borden and others
with famous trade names; i.e., must sell at a higher price than
the ordinary dealers already in business. This was carried
up on the same clauses of the 14th Amendment, and at last
the worm turned. The badgered court, in Mayflower Farms
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vs. Ten Eyck, 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 457 (Feb. 10, 1936), held
that this in effect prohibited any new dealer from entering the
business and considered the classification to be arbitrary,
oppressive and a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
The three so-called liberal judges dissented.
Earlier in time, but the final stroke in the economic picture, came Baldwin vs. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, a good illustration of the lengths to which a legislature may be driven in
bolstering up an attempt to make economic adjustments by
fixing prices. A dealer, not satisfied with the law-made 100
per cent spread between his buying price and selling price,
began importing milk from Vermont where there was no price
control and where farmers would sell for less than 5 cents per
quart. The milk board countered by totally prohibiting the
sale in New York of milk imported from other states if it had
been bought there for less than the New York price to farmers.
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously enjoined this as a
restriction of commerce between the states and as an attempt
to neutralize price advantages prevailing in the state of origin
by what amounted to a customs barrier errected by one state
against another. Thus we see New York, starting with
more milk than it knew what to do with, and ending by
bringing in an additional flood of milk from other states, all
by its own regimentation. Sic semper tyrannis! The court,
of course, sedulously avoids any opinion as to the wisdom or
policy of any of the measures before it, but even the court,
while sustaining one of these milk laws, could not refrain from
saying:
"The present case affords an excellent example of the difficulties
and complexities which confront the legislator who essays to interfere
in sweeping terms with the natural laws of trade or industry."

The upshot of these cases is that a state statute will be
upheld against the 14th Amendment if it relates to any matter
of public welfare and is not glaringly arbitrary. To be set
aside, it must either have a private-rather than a public bearing or it must involve such gross inequality or do such unnecessary damage to individuals as to shock the conscience. Here
the difference between the two lines of thought in the court
is very clear. The conservatives try to preserve individual
rights against undue statutory interference; the liberals treat
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the legislative power as almost unlimited in any possible field
of public interest, and decline to apply the constitutional restrictions unless the lawmakers have acted as "arbitrary
despots" (Cardozo, J.). The old wing emphasizes individualism, the other collectivism. There is logic on both sides
and the majority may be moving with the times, but it seems
to me that the constitution concerns itself very specially with
individual liberty, and that the alternative to individual liberty is collective tyranny. Here again Mr. Jefferson says:
"It would be a dangerous delusion if our confidence in the men of
our choice (i. e., the legislators) should silence our fears for the safety
of our rights. * * * In questions of power, then, let no more be
heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the
chains of the constitution."

Following this great authority, I think that the courts
are the last, and often the only defense of liberty, and that it is
a pity when they stretch the constitution to uphold the passing crotchets of legislatures such as we all have known.
However, this is merely an idle reflection, since the Supreme Court thinks otherwise. In the days of that outstanding and dominant personality, Grover Cleveland, there was a
popular song about him, the refrain of which ran:
"And when the old man says a thing,
Why, that's the thing that goes;
For the old man says so,
And the old man knows."

So of the Supreme Court.
The famous cases of the recent past, sustaining or overthrowing acts of Congress, are fresh in your memory, and are
far too massive for summary treatment. Only the gold cases
and the Triple A case seem to me to present any legal novelty.
With the others the novelty is not in the constitutional law
announced by the court, but in the measures to which that law
was applied. This struck the court itself, since the majority
opinion in the Triple A case, after instancing many fantastic
laws which might follow if the Triple A were upheld, adds:
"It cannot be said that they envisage improbable legislation. The
supposed cases are no more improbable than would the present act have
been deemed a few years ago."
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These recent cases cannot well be classified, for Congress
is now seen casually handing over its law-making power to
Tom, Dick, Harry or Franklin, and now arrogating that
power over fields belonging to the states, or to individuals.
The only qualities common to most of the questioned acts are
a purpose to help the less fortunate by reforming national
economy, and the assumption of unlimited power to do so,
including the power to transfer power. Several of these acts
rather candidly embody the idea of taking one man's property
and giving it to another, which still remains a legislative solecism. The existence of a supreme law, restraining Congress,
as well as the rest of us. is ignored, and the fact that some of
these measures do fall within the constitution seems almost
accidental. Assuming a constitution, the court's rejection of
the others was inevitable. Time allows a mere mention of
some of the more spectacular cases. In Panama Refining Co.
vs. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, the court, standing 8-1, rejected the
clause of the NIRA authorizing the president to prohibit or
not, as he pleased, the movement in interstate commerce of oil
produced or taken from storage in excess of the amount
allowed by the state of origin. This for the elementary reason
that Congress, to which the constitution gives "all legislative
power," had made no law regulating the transit of oil, but
virtually gave the president the right to legislate regarding it
to suit himself.
In RailroadRetirement Board vs. Alton R. R., 295 U. S.
330, the Railway Pension Act was overthrown by a 5-4 decision. In speaking of it to a railroad attorney I said that in
the majority opinion Mr. Justice Roberts first tore the act into
shreds, and then stamped and spat on the shreds, which I
think is a fair summary of the decision. The dissenters thought
that if a few extreme clauses were rejected the bulk of the act
might stand, and especially urged that the majority went too
far in holding that no railway pension act lay within the
interstate commerce power. It would not surprise me if a
fairer and more moderate bill were some day passed and sustained.
In Louisville Land Bank vs. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, the
Frazier-Lemke amendment to the Bankruptcy Act in favor of
farmer mortgagors was unanimously held unconstitutional.
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Congress under the bankruptcy power may discharge the
debtor's personal obligation, but it cannot take the creditor's
secured rights in specific property. To do so would be to
take one man's property and give it to another, and if public
necessity should require such result, it could be legally done
only under the eminent domain power and on payment of just
compensation. This act has been redrafted by lawyers holding this decision in one hand and the Minnesota mortgage
case in the other, and the lower federal courts are already at
variance as to the validity of the new act.
As to the three gold cases in 294 U. S. (Norman vs. B. &
0. R. R., p. 240; Nortz vs. U. S., p. 317; Perry vs. U. S., p.
330), the syllabi alone cover seven pages; the cases themselves
140 pages; they touch the very foundations of government;
how can one discuss them here? They are unusual because it
is seldom that the court has to construe the power of Congress
"to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
coin." Under this section the Court, by a 5-4 decision, upheld the various acts devaluing the dollar, calling in gold, and
authorizing the payment of gold obligations, public or private, in the depreciated currency, dollar for dollar, but with
one important qualification. Congress could not repudiate
the promise to pay in gold, set forth in government bonds. To
do so would destroy the faith and credit of the United States,
pledged for these bonds, and might at some critical time result
in the overthrow of the nation itself. The promise to pay in
gold was that of a greater than Congress, viz.: the sovereign
people, besides which, the 14th Amendment provides that
"the validity of the public debt of the United States * * *
shall not be questioned." However, said the court, if the
treasury had paid gold to the holder of a government bond he
would have had immediately to turn it back, and the currency he actually received was worth as much in purchasing
power as gold, for any purpose for which he could lawfully
use gold. Therefore, he sustained only nominal damages.
The conservatives considered this a quibble, and maybe
it was. If the bondholder had been a nonresident foreigner
and had been paid in depreciated currency, not circulating in
his own country, instead of the gold his bond called for, he
would have sustained a very substantial loss. It is worth
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noting that Congress paid the Philippine government an extra
amount in devalued currency so as to equal the actual loss sustained by the inflation, and has recently done the same thing
with the Republic of Panama.
However, under the necessities of the case it is hard to see
how the decision could have been otherwise. If the holders
of many billions of bonds, public and private, could have
enforced payment in current money of $1.69 for each $1.00
of their bonds, the new economic structure of the nation might
have been totally wrecked. This is not a legal argument, but
courts do not ignore such facts.
Few cases could be of greater public importance than the
NRA decision (Schechter Poultry Co. vs. U. S., 295 U. S.
495) ; yet the law involved was simple and the rejection of the
act inevitable. So thought a unanimous court. Mr. Justice
Cardozo filed a concurring opinion in which he flayed the act
more cruelly than the others did. It is dead and gone now,
and we need only note that it rested on two glaring errors.
(1) Congress attempted to hand over its law-making power,
first to various undefined trade groups or associations, and
finally to the president, giving these delegates power to make
codes having the force of law, although Congress had not defined what such law should be; (2) it empowered the president to assume complete control of every detail of trade and
industry throughout the nation in a way that would have
completely extinguished the reserved power of the states over
their domestic affairs. It thus struck at the very foundation
of our dual system. Even the chief justice, always moderate,
was stirred by so unprecedented a measure, and asks whether
anyone ever supposed that Congress could hand to any one
man a roaming commission to dictate laws for all the industries of the United States.
If you care to read the act (48 Stat. L. 195) and the
opinion you can decide for yourselves whether it was framed
in ignorance of the constitution or in defiance of it. There
used to be plenty of lawyers in Congress not without repute
before they joined that body.
The next great case is that of Triple A (U. S. vs. Butler,
56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 312), usually called the Hoosac Mills case,
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where the Agricultural Adjustment Act was held invalid on
a 6-3 division, the three regular liberals dissenting. None of
the recent decisions is more important legally and I wish there
were time to analyze it. It is also novel, because the court
has seldom had to consider the limits of the power of Congress under Art. 1, Sec. 8, of the constitution authorizing it
"to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay
the debts and provide for the general welfare of the United
States." No term could be wider than "general welfare." Are
there any bounds to what Congress may do within it through
the medium of a tax with which it can buy or coerce obedience to its will?
Here the government urged that agriculture was essential
to the general welfare and that therefore it could levy a tax to
foster it. Plaintiffs contended that Congress' right to act in
any direction was restricted to its specifically enumerated powers; in other words, that these powers covered and limited the
general welfare for which it could tax and spend. The court
rejected both views, holding that the power to tax is wider
than the enumerated powers, yet is not unlimited. The cardinal and fundamental feature of our system is the dual government of state and nation, and the wide right to tax for general
welfare is limited by the still wider restriction that Congress must not invade the reserved powers of the states. Powers not expressly granted to Congress are prohibited to it. No
power is granted to regulate agricultural production; therefore, that power remains in the states and Congress may not
assume it. Also, if Congress could do this with agriculture,
it could equally control every field of trade or activity
throughout the nation, and exact money from one branch of
an industry in order to pay it to another.
There was a vigorous dissent and a lawyer whom I asked
what he thought of the case replied that he had read the opinion and the dissent and thought they were both right. The
gist of the dissent is that, admitting that Congress may not
use tax money to coerce action in matters within state control,
yet it is not debarred from influencing such action; that it has
often done so under the interstate commerce and other powers, and that here the coercive effect of the act is not established
but rests only on a process of speculative reasoning. It is evi-
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dent that the majority felt that the vague authority to levy
taxes to provide for the general welfare had to be defined and
restricted. A broad interpretation of the words would allow
Congress to do anything and everything. It might reduce or
increase production, fix wages or hours, define conditions of
employment, distribute the industrial population, raise or
lower prices, regulate the professions or do anything whatsoever that it pleased by the simple device of levying a tax in
such a way as either to purchase or compel compliance with its
will. Thus it could destroy the police power of every state
by occupying the field itself. Here again the decision was compulsory. There was a choice between rejecting the act or
renouncing our dual system of government. It is interesting
to note that abuse by Congress of the taxing power under this
section was attacked in veto and other messages by presidents
as diverse as Monroe, Jackson, Tyler, Polk, Pierce, Grant,
Arthur, Cleveland and Harding.
The Tennessee Valley Authority case, Ashwander us. T.
V. A., 56 Sup. Ct. Rep. 466 (Feb. 17, 1936), promised to be
one of the first importance and was expected to decide the
right of the federal government to go into business in competition with private light and power companies. However, the
decision fell within narrow bounds and left this undetermined. It expressly states that no opinion is passed on the
governmental power to operate distribution systems, or to
build the three other dams now under construction, or as to
what the government might do with the water power therefrom or as to the validity of the TVA act itself. All that it
decides is that when the government builds a dam under the
war clause and the commerce clause and generates thereby more
electric power than it needs for war or commerce purposes, it
can sell that power, under Art. 4, Sec. 3, of the constitution,
authorizing Congress to dispose of the property of the United
States, and since it can sell it, it can acquire transmission lines
to carry it to market. The majority here was 8-1.
We know that the purpose of the TVA is to build other
dams and create a vast system of generation and distribution
in competition with private companies. The opinion is so
carefully worded as to give little clue to the probable fate of
the scheme when it comes before the court.
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As you have noticed, many of these vital cases ring with
dissent, and it would be interesting to know-what we never
shall know-what takes place in the conference room. Occasionally the language of an opinion gives some hint. For
example, in one of the New York milk cases Judge Cardozo,
dissenting, describes part of Judge Roberts' opinion as "a
juggling with words," and in the Triple A case Judge Stone,
dissenting, says that part of the majority's reasoning "hardly
rises to the dignity of argument." Of the present bench, Judge
Cardozo commands the most picturesque English and is at
times diffuse in its use. In one instance where he delivered the
florid and very lengthy majority opinion, Judge McReynolds
commenced his dissent with the curt remark: "This case has
been greatly obscured by verbiage." Thus judges themselves
remind us that they are human.
It was said earlier that dissent in the court is frequently
due to the conflicting trends of thought of the different judges.
This might be expanded a little. It is elementary that every
intendment must be made in favor of the constitutionality of
a statute. It must be accepted if by any reasonable construction of it or of the constitution it can be brought within the
scope of that instrument. The court constantly announces
this rule, and never more punctiliously than when about to
declare a statute unconstitutional. Now, when a doubtful
case comes before the court, I believe the conservative attitude
is something like this:
"After all, the final responsibility is ours. This court is the designated interpreter of the constitution and the last resort of the people. If,
by reason of some scintilla of doubt, we uphold an act which, on balancing reasons, we feel to be unconstitutional, we shirk our duty, and
subject the people to an act of tyranny, for any act which Congress had
no power to pass is necessarily such. We are bound, therefore, to reject
the act, and leave Congress to pass another, clearly within constitutional

limits."

The liberals, I think, reason somewhat as follows:
'Congress which passed this act, and the president who signed it,
are presumed to have judged it constitutional after due deliberation. To
substitute our judgment for theirs, except in a perfectly clear case, is a
usurpation of power. They, not we, represent the people; the responsibility for the act is theirs, not ours. The duty to refrain from thwarting the will of the people, as voiced by their representatives, is so impera-
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tive, and the presumption of constitutionality is so controlling that, if
we have any doubt whatsoever, we must uphold the act."

You see that both views are entirely reasonable and yet
that, in a close case, they must inevitably clash.
However, when one reads these great cases together and
not at long intervals as they appear, they fall into line, and
form a straight course of singularly level-headed and evenhanded adjudication. With our constitution as it is, it is
hard to see how any one of the cases involving federal statutes
could have been decided otherwise than it was. It is a small
matter, but worth notice, that in only two of the great cases
was there a 5-4 decision-the gold group where the act was
sustained, and the railway pension case, where it was rejected.
We have nine honest, resolute and very able men, representing
the two main attitudes of human thought and constitutional
construction, so evenly divided that the best reason can always
command a majority over any unconscious bias. We are
indeed fortunate in a time of popular ferment that the last
word as to our rights rests with so sane and impartial a body.
In all this I am taking the constitution for granted.
Whether it should be changed or not is another question, but
how well the present instrument has served its intended purpose is seen from the vigorous words of John Randolph. Inquiring into the need of a restrictive constitution, and how the
people had come to assent to it, he said:
"It was because of the radical depravity and original sin of their
nature, which called for wholesome restraint. In a lucid interval, they
had wisely determined to tie up the hands, not only of their agents, but
themselves, that, when the hour of passion should come, barriers might

be opposed to their inconsiderate rashness."

PERIODS DURING WHICH JUDGES WILL SIT-1936
Judge Robert W. Steele
....-------June 29 to July 11, Inclusive --------------July 13 to July 25, Inclusive ---------------------------------.Judge Otto Bock
July 27 to August 8, Inclusive ----...------- Judge Frank McDonough, Sr.
August 10 to August 22, Inclusive ----------Judge Charles C. Sackmann
August 24 to September 5, Inclusive -----------Judge J. C. Starkweather
All Return September 8 (Day After Labor Day)
Judge Calvert to July 18; Judge
CRIMINAL DIVISION:
Dunklee, July 20 to September 8.
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BY THE RETIRING PRESIDENT
It has been said that
historically the public and
private consciences of law.
yers have borne a direct relation to the degree of bar
organization achieved by
legal associations (Charles
E. Lane, Annual Proceedings of the Wyoming State
Bar Association, 1 9 3 0 1934, page 28). If this
be true, the situation in
Colorado and Denver is
truly encouraging.
This
Association, by a I m o s t
unanimous vote, has recommended that the State Association be integrated. Similar a c t i o n subsequently
taken by other local associations makes it probable
that a "unified state bar"
will soon exist. Our local
Association, too, has steadily moved forward. Being
a local Association it cannot formally integrate. But
ROBERT E. MORE
during the past decade the
monthly meetings have been
better attended, and the
committees on programs have furnished stimulating subjects of discussion. At the same time the members have realized that prompt payment
of dues is a sine qua non of effective committee investigation and accomplishment in such vital matters as the curbing of the unlawful practice
of the law, disciplinary measures, the selection of judges, fixing of judicial salaries, etc., as well as in the social gathering of members at banquets, outings, smokers and monthly meetings. The utility of a voluntary local association depends upon the cooperation and enthusiasm of
its members, and the unselfish giving of time by committees. The past
administration has been unusually fortunate in both of these respects,
and grateful acknowledgment is hereby made. The Association is happy
indeed in its choice of Ernest B. Fowler as President for the ensuing
year. The Association pledges to him its loyal support.

OF JURYAUTOMOBILES- COLLISION-NEGLIGENCE -PROVINCE
NEGLIGENCE OF DRIVER NOT IMPUTABLE TO GUEST-Forsythe

vs. McCarthy-No. 13707-8-Decided March 16, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Forsythe owned an auto truck which, at the time of the accident,
was loaded with merchandise and being operated on a public highway.
A collision occurred between this truck and an automobile in which the
daughter, a minor, was riding as a guest. The automobile was following the truck and the truck made a lefthand turn and the automobile
collided with it, negligence being alleged the failure to give any signal
of a lefthand turn. Judgment for plaintiff.
1. The evidence being sharply conflicting and resolved in plaintiff's favor by the jury, no complaint being, made as to the amount of
the verdict, such a verdict properly withstands an attack on review, if
the instructions to the jury were not erroneous.
2. Instruction No. 10, while not a model for excellence, fairly
instructed the jury that negligence of the driver of the automobile in
which plaintiff was a guest is not imputable to the plaintiff. Such is
the law unless negligence is the sole cause of the accident.
3. While the court should have instructed the jury with a definition of proximate cause, the absence of such definition resulted in no
confusion when the other plain instructions are considered together as a
whole.-Judgment affirmed.
NEW TRIAL-DIRECTED VERDICT-CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-Barr
vs. Aarons-No. 13623-Decided March 9, 1936-Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell.
Plaintiff, Barr, in her complaint charged that she held a second
trust deed on certain real property. The defendant's attorney came to
her home when she was sick and falsely told her that he had a deal by
which he was to get the first trust deed paid off and also her second trust
deed paid. Relying thereon, she signed a release of her second trust deed.
At the close of the evidence produced by the plaintiff the trial court
denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Thereupon, Aarons
produced evidence which directly contradicted the evidence of the plaintiff. The trial court took the case from the jury and gave judgment for
the defendant.
1. Where the evidence is in direct conflict it is error for the court
to take the case from the jury. The matter should have been submitted
to the jury.--Jdgmenrt reuersed.
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MANDAMUS-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-FRANCHISE OR REVOCABLE PERMIT-USE OF STREET BY BUSSES-The People on rela-

tion of Foley vs. Begole et al.-No. 13563-Decided March 9,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The City of Denver, by ordinance, granted the Tramway Company a "revocable permit" to operate passenger busses on Marion Street.
Foley brought mandamus to compel the cancellation thereof. The city
demurred for want of facts, defect of parties, and want of jurisdiction.
The demurrer was sustained by the trial court.
1. Under Section 281 of the City Charter the council may grant
a license or permit at any time, in or to any street, alley or public place,
provided such license or permit shall be revocable at any time, and such
right to revoke shall be expressly reserved in every license or permit
which may be granted hereunder.
2. The city in granting the permit acted under said Section 281.
3.
Such right to use the streets for busses was a revocable permit
and was not a franchise requiring a vote of the qualified taxpaying
electors.
4. Anyone may use the streets and highways for ordinary purposes. This right extends even to conducting such business thereon as
does not permanently occupy and obstruct the highway to the exclusion
of others. If the business permanently occupies and obstructs the highway, as by the laying of car tracks, the right to do so can only be granted
by franchise.
5. There was a want of jurisdiction below. Mandamus will not
lie. The writ may be issued only to compel the performance of an
action which the law specially enjoins.
6. The department of the city here proceeded against is the legislative and the only action sought is the repeal of legislation, and this
can only be accomplished by the passage of legislation; that is, a repealing ordinance, and this the courts are powerless to command.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Butler not participating.
WILLS-CONTEST-FRAUD-DESTRUCTION

OF LETTERS BY BENE-

FICIARY OF WILL-DIRECTED VERDICT-Huber vs. Boyle et al.
-No. 13801-Decided March 9, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice

Butler.
This is a contest over the will of Samuel Holmes. In his will he
named as his sole devisees and legatees his nieces, Daisy M. Holmes and
her sister, Florence Holmes Soule. Miss Holmes filed petition for probate in which she stated that she and her sister were the only heirs at
law. At that time she knew that there were other heirs which she failed
to list. The will was admitted and thereafter Mrs. Huber filed a motion
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to vacate the order of admittance. Thereupon, Miss Holmes filed a petition to reprobate the will, including Mrs. Huber as an heir. Mrs. Huber
filed a caveat and in the County Court the will was sustained. On
appeal to the District Court the will was sustained on a directed verdict.
1. Where it appears that at the time the testator executed the will
he labored under the mistake and belief that his sister was dead and
such mistake and belief was caused by false representations knowingly
made by the beneficiaries in his will, with the fraudulent purpose of
inducing the testator to make his will in their favor, to the exclusion of
his sister, and he 'so made the will in reliance upon such representations,
the will would be void.
2. If such representations were made by one of them, the other
not participating, the devise and bequest to the wrongdoer would be
void.
3. The devise and bequest of the innocent beneficiary would be
valid in the absence of a showing that such devise and bequest were
affected by the representations.
4. There was sufficient evidence of fraud to submit the case to the
jury.
5. Fraud is never presumed. The one asserting it must prove it
by evidence that is clear, precise and indubitable.
6. Where it appears that the beneficiaries under the will destroyed
letters wilfully with the intention and for the purpose of making it impossible to prove the contents in any will contest, the jury should be
permitted to infer that the letters if produced would have supported the
case of the contestor. Miss Holmes having admitted the destruction of
the letters by her, the burden was upon her to repeal the inference of
fraudulent intent and her explanation was for the jury to consider.
7. The court erred in directing the verdict.-Judgment reversed.
RAPE-PRINCIPAL AND ACCESSORY-DIRECTED VERDICT-PHOTOGRAPHS RECENT COMPLAINT CROSS EXAMINATION - De

Salvo vs. The People-No. 13806-Decided March 9, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
De Salvo was found guilty of forcibly raping Matilda Zupancic.
A motion for a new trial was denied and the defendant was sentenced
to imprisonment.
1. The evidence supports the verdict of guilty.
2. Where the information charges two persons with having committed the crime of rape and one fled and the other is tried alone and it
appears from the evidence that the one who fled stood by and aided,
abetted and assisted the other, he was therefore an accessory during the
fact and they were properly jointly charged.
3. Photographs taken of the girl two days after the alleged
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assault coupled with testimony that they showed the condition of the
girl's body as it existed immediately after the assault were properly
admitted.
4. Where the girl complained to her family on the morning of
the assault and later on the same morning complained to officers of the
commission of the act, such testimony was admissible. Prosecution is
not limited to one recent complaint.
5. The court properly curtailed the cross examination of the girl
where it appears that counsel was continuing and repeating the same
lines of questions that he had already asked many times.--Judgment
affirmed.
TAXATION-MOTOR FUEL TAX LAW-DEMURRER-INTERSTATE
COMMERCE-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-The State of Colorado vs.

Tolbert et al.-No. 13596-Decided March 23, 1936--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Bouch.

The State of Colorado applied for an injunction to restrain defendants from using motor fuel imported by them from the State of Kansas
upon which no tax was paid and which was so imported with a plan
and design to avoid the payment thereof. A violation of the act constituting a misdemeanor. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained
below and suit was dismissed.
1. The complaint stated a cause of action.
2. Continuous and flagrant violation of the motor fuel statute,
the violation of which is a misdemeanor and not a crime, warrants the
issuance of an injunction to prevent such continuous violation where the

defendants are execution proof and financially irresponsible.

3. The title of the act is broad enough to include all that is
involved in this injunction suit.
4. The act does not contravene section 7 of article X of the Colorado constitution.
5. The act in no manner violates the United States constitution
with reference to interstate commerce. The statute specifically states that
it shall not apply to motor fuel used in interstate commerce.-Judgment
reversed.
Mr. Justice Campbell dissents.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-METHOD OF DETERMINING AVERAGE
WEEKLY WAGE WHERE EMPLOYEE WORKS FOR HIMSELF PART

TIME-Imperial Coal Company et al. vs. Holland et al.-No.
13892-Decided March 23, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
Claimant was allowed compensation for a compensable injury
based on his total earnings in a mine divided by 26 weeks. The evidence
showed he worked in the mine approximately half the time during the
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preceding year of his injury and the other half of the time for himself
as a farmer.
1. In estimating average weekly wages earned the number of
weeks the employee was in business for himself during the year preceding the accident should be deducted from the total number of weeks in
the year and his average weekly earnings determined by dividing the total
amount so earned by the remaining number of weeks.-Judment
affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck not participating.

OF SECTION 73 OF
INDUSTRIAL ACT-Leyden Lignite Company et al. vs. Buddy
et al.-No. 13906-Decided March 23, 1396--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
Buddy was awarded compensation on ground of permanent partial disability equivalent to 20 per cent of a working unit and instead
of a weekly allowance for 88 4/10 weeks he was allowed a lump sum
of $3640.00, payable in installments until the full sum of $3640.00
shall have been paid. The award of the commission was affirmed by the
district court.
1. Section 73 of the workmen's compensation act provides that
in case of loss or partial loss of use of a member, compensation may be
determined by a comparative estimate or the commission may award
compensation under the permanent partial disability section which is
Section 78.
2. Compensation was properly allowed under the above.
3. Injuries specifically covered by Section 73 refer not only to
loss of a member but also to loss or partial loss of the use thereof.Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CONSTRUCTION

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ELECTION OF REMEDIES-SUIT BY
EMPLOYEE TO COLLECT COMMON LAW DAMAGES-Industrial

Commission of Colorado vs. Schaefer Realty Company-No.
13832-Decided March 23, 1396--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
Rosetta, an employee who suffered a compensatory injury in the
course of his employment, elected to bring a suit at common law against
his employer for damages for personal injuries. He lost the suit and he
thereafter filed a claim for compensation under the workmen's compensa.
tion act. The defense was that he, having elected in the first instance
to bring a suit for damages, that he was not entitled to recover compensation under the act. The district court sustained this contention.
1. Where an employee elected to bring suit against his employer
for damages for injuries sustained and is unsuccessful in the suit, he is
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precluded thereafter from claiming compensation under the workmen's
compensation act.
2. The two remedies are so entirely different that an election to
proceed under one bars an action under the other.-udgment affirmd.
Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
BOUNDARIES-DISPUTE OVER-APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERJURISDICTION - METHOD OF APPOINTING - INSTRUCTIONS REPORT OF COMMISSIONER-Gibson et at. vs. Neikirk et a.-

No. 13545-Decided March 16, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouch.

This was an appeal from a judgment entered by the district court
of Yuma county in proceedings to establish disputed boundaries.
1. Where commissioner was appointed by the court to survey and
establish disputed boundary lines after service of summons on part of
the defendants, but before all defendants were served, and before trial of
the action, the defendants who had not theretofore been served made a
general appearance and it appears that their rights were not prejudiced
by the premature appointment, no prejudicial error was committed.
2. Where defendants failed to request the court to give any specific instructions to the commissioner, but it appears that the commissioner proceeded in the proper manner, no prejudicial error occurred.
3. Where the commissioner sent out a notice to the parties stating the time and place of beginning his work and defendants made no
objections to him and it appears that he attempted the ordinary method
of surveyors for doing the work, the defendants cannot complain.
4. After the report of the commissioner was received the court
below gave all parties an opportunity of correcting any mistakes or
errors by a hearing in open court. The objections to the report are overruled.
5. Where, after the incoming of the report the court permitted
the appellants to raise the issue of over 20 years recognition of, and
acquiescence in, certain boundaries alleged to be the true ones and thereupon made a finding that certain of the boundaries had been so acquiesced in, this modified the findings of the commissioner in favor of the
appellants and they cannot complain.
6. Rule 32 of this court requires an error to be "separately
alleged and particularly specified," and merely specifying that the court
erred in receiving certain testimony tendered by plaintiffs over objection
of the defendants is an insufficient allegation of error.-'Judgment

affirmed.

TAXES-DISTRAINT

WARRANT-LEVY-LIABILITY

OF SHERIFF-

LIABILITY OF DEFENDANT-Robeson vs. Bennett-No. 13630-

Decided March 16, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.

Bennett brought this action against Robeson, owner of a theater
building and against the county treasurer and against the sheriff claim-
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ing that under pretense of issuing and serving a distraint warrant for
the collection of taxes against a moving picture machine located in the
building that instead of removing the personal property that they closed
the theater and padlocked it, thereby ruining the plaintiff's theater business carried on there. Judgment was entered below in favor of the
plaintiff.
1. The provision in written lease providing against assignment
against the lessee without the written consent of the lessor is for the
lessor's benefit and can be waived by parol or implied from the facts.
2. The plaintiff's loss is undisputed. The plaintiff did not
owe the taxes, nor did the personal property which was located in the
theater and against which the taxes were assessed belong to the real
estate and this personal property consisting of a moving picture machine
could have been removed under the distraint warrant without padlocking the theater. Instead of so doing, under the guise of this tax
levy, the plaintiff's place of business was closed and padlocked, his
lease ignored and he lost his business. The judgment below returns
to him only his purchase price.--Judgment affirmed.
ATTORNEYS-SUSPENSION-ORIGINAL

PROCEEDINGS-FORGERY-

Melville vs. Wettengel-No. 13931-Decided April 21, 1936Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
This was an original proceeding brought in the Supreme Court by
the petitioner, Melville, against Wettengel, a member of the bar and
district attorney, praying that a citation issue commanding the respondent to show cause why he should not be disbarred and punished for contempt of the court for having committed perjury before the committee
on grievances of the Colorado Bar Association at a hearing before it
upon charges preferred against him by the committee on order of the
court. Citation to show cause was issued and respondent filed a return
to which petitioner replied and the issues were tried before the Supreme
Court en banc, Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not sitting or participating.
The petitioner alleged that the respondent had sworn falsely before the committee in that he had produced and vouched for a, photostatic reproduction of an asserted registration card of Hotel Dixon, Kansas City, Missouri, bearing serial number 14001, and in the handwriting of the respondent, which, on its face, showed that the respondent
and his wife registered at that hotel on April 19, 1933, whereas in fact
said card was a fabrication in which respondent connived for the purpose
of defending himself against a charge of perjury, before a grand jury,
being investigated by the committee. In support of these allegations
there were annexed to the petition the photostatic reproduction aforesaid,
and a like reproduction of an asserted registration card of said hotel, also
bearing serial number 14001, of the same date, and alleged not to be
in the handwriting of the respondent. In the first of these cards, identified as Exhibit 2, the registrants' names and addresses appear as "Mr.
& Mrs. Harold Proctor, 1195 South Ogden St., Denver, Colorado,"
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while in the second card, Exhibit 3, the names and addresses are "Harold Proctor 1E Wife, St. Louis, Mo." In his return the respondent
admitted that he had produced and vouched for Exhibit 2 as substantiation that he had in fact registered at the hotel on the date indicated. He
further alleged that Exhibit 3 was not a genuine registration card of the
hotel, and that if such a card was found in the records of the hotel, as

the petitioner averred, it was "necessarily a fabricated, spurious registration card, forged and fabricated since respondent testified before said
committee."
1. Exhibit 3, the original of which was produced on the trial,
was clearly and conclusively proven to be a genuine registration card of
Hotel Dixon.
2. Exhibit 2, the original of which the hotel's manager testified
could not be found or produced, was clearly and convincingly shown to
be a forgery, fabricated by and for the respondent with intent on his
part to mislead and deceive the committee.
3. It is not necessary to pass upon respondent's motion to strike
a part of the petition upon the ground that it is abusive, although it
seems clear no issuable fact was presented by the part in question.
4. It is not necessary to determine whether the respondent's conduct before the committee was contemptuous. If it was, the judgment
entered herein is sufficient punishment; if it was not, the judgment would
be no less severe.
5. Ordered, that the respondent be indefinitely suspended as a
member of the bar of the court.
6. The question whether this order works a forfeiture of respondent's office as district attorney of the second judicial district is not before
the court. Therefore, as doubt may arise concerning the effect of this
order upon the right of the respondent to continue in office and as to the
validity of his acts as such official, with resultant uncertainty and litigation, it is further ordered that the suspension of the respondent shall not
forbid his performance of the duties of the office until the expiration of
his present term.-Rule sustainedand respondent indefinitely suspended.
PLEADING-AMENDED

COMPLAINT-DEMURRER-DEPARTURE-

Ahart us. Barrett et al.-No. 13747-Decided March 30, 1936Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Campbell.
This action was determined below on motion of defendants to
strike an amended complaint on the ground that the amended complaint
departed from the original complaint to which a demurrer had been sustained for want of facts. The motion was sustained and judgment of
dismissal entered.
1. Where, after demurrer to a former pleading has been sustained
and the losing party files an amended pleading, he may not assign error
to the ruling holding his original pleading insufficient.
2. The court below had the right to compare the amended com-
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plaint with the original in order to determine whether there was a departure.
3. The amended complaint clearly departed from the original

complaint and the ruling of the court below was right.--udgment
affirmed.
OF POOR HOUSE-RESIDENCEABSENTEE VOTES-Israel vs. Wood-No. 13 874-DeidedApril

ELECTIONS--CONTEST-INMATES

6, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.

At the November, 1932, election Israel, the contestor, and Wood,
the contestee, were rival candidates for the office of sheriff of Ouray
county. On former proceedings in error to the supreme court, the
supreme court held that in counting four votes of inmates of the poorhouse for the contestee that the court erred, because it was not shown
that the voters were reiidents of the precinct in which the poorhouse
was situated and the cause was remanded for evidence and finding concerning the last place of residence of the poorhouse voters prior to their
becoming inmates of the poorhouse. The county court thereupon took
evidence and found that the last place of residence of three of such voters
was in the precinct where the poorhouse was situated and that their
votes should be counted for the contestee, but two other votes were
rejected by the court, which resulted in a tie and judgment was entered
in accordance therewith.
1. The contestee requested a dismissal on the ground that the term
of office for which the parties were candidates has expired. The motion
cannot be sustained. Compensation is an incident to the office of sheriff
and the contestor had such an interest in the compensation as to be
entitled to prosecute the case, because if he should be held to be elected
to the office he would be entitled to recover the compensation that the
contestee received.
2. Mere temporary absence from a precinct during the cold
weather, coupled with an intention to return to the precinct where one
lives coupled with the actual fact of the returning thereto does not change
the place of residence of the voter.
3. Where the only question referred to the supreme court on a
former hearing was the question of a witness' residence just before his
admission to the poorhouse it is too late to raise the additional question
that the voter had not resided in the state for one year.
4. Where inmates of a poorhouse cast absent voters' ballots and
the trial court found that the voters were too seriously ill to attend the
polls and there was sufficient evidence to support the same, such finding
will not be disturbed.
5. Where a voter is blind the judges and clerks are not the only
ones entitled to render him assistance in marking his ballot, as the blind
person may select any other elector to assist him.
6. No questions not mentioned in contestor's verified statement of
contest will be considered.--dudgmentaffirmed.
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NEW BOOKS
(Courtesy of CLERK F. D.

STACKHOUSE)

New books received in the District Court Law Library consist of
Cooley on Torts, 3 volumes; Newell, 4th Ed. on Slander and Libel;
volumes 1 and 2 American Jurisprudence-this is a new edition to supplement Ruling Case Law.
A new edition of Corpus Juris will be out soon, title of which
will be Corpus Juris Secundum.

FOR SALE
.....
_

Set of A. L. R., 97 Volumes and Digests, $250.00
EDWARD D. UPHAM

Phone TAbor 5923

507 E. & C. Bldg.

BRADFORD
PRINTERS

e

1824-38 STOUT STREET

-ROBINSON

LITHOGRAPHERS
KEYSTONE 0111

When you need Stationery-Briefs-Legal Forms, etc.

Midland Liquor
& Wine Co.

Compliments o/

Forrest M. Wise
230 Coronado Bldg, Denver, Colo.

CH. 3047
412 17th St.
Free Delivery Service

KEystone 3288

Catering to the discriminating
tastes of the Legal Profession
at prices in keeping with quality

PLACE ADAMS COUNTY LEGALS I

(4
"Wines and Liquors from All
Over the Globe"

THE ADAMS COUNTY
REPUBLICAN
Official Paper for Adams County
Kindly Designate Our Paper for Any
Legal Notices Appearing in
Adams County
aprebe highly
Your
you. satiofaeatnd we canwill
assure
ciated cooperation
tion and service in return.
B. GALEN GAUNT, Publisher
Brighton, Colorado

Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co.

HEAR Normally Again with the
New Western Electric Audiphones
(By Bell Telephone Makers)
Either bone or air conduction hearing
scientifically fitted to the individual as
an optometrist fits your glasses. Drop
in for information.

B. J. Harrington, Manager

M. F. TAYLOR
LABORATORIES

Denver

16th and Tremont Sts., MAin 1920

Patterson Building
KEystone 1397

Lobby Republic Bldg.

Make a Date for Sunday
There are bargain rates all day every Sunday
on long distance calls. Both station-to-station
and person-to-person rates are reduced. Enjoy
a telephone visit with the folks back home,
far-away relatives or friends you seldom see.

Whose voice would you like to hear?

